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The federal authority for macroeconomic man-  the federal government. So it is interesting to
agement in Brazil changed profoundly with the  find out to what extent the federal control over
institutional changes that culminated in a new  macroeconomic management gets diluted in a
federal constitution in October 1988.  highly decentralized federation such as the one
that now exists in Brazil.
Bomfim and Shah analyzed the implications
of the new fiscal arrangements for the federal  The authors found evidence that the new
exercise of macroeconomic policies.  federalism has limited, but not imperiled, the
scope of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool.  On
The literature on fiscal federalism stresses  the other hand, federal control over monetary
that stabilization policies are best carried out by  policy has improved.
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Executive Summary
The  federal  authority  for  macroecononic  management  in  Brazil  has
experienced a  profound  change  as  a  result  of  the  institutional changes  that
culminated with  the  promulgation of  a  new Federal Constitution in  October of
1988. This  paper  examines the  implications of  the  new  fiscal arrangements for
the exercise of macroeconomic  policies by the federal government.
The  two  pillars  of  macroeconomic management are  fiscal  and  monetary
policies.  The  fiscal  federalism literature  reserves  for  the  federal  government
the  fundamental role  in  the  performance of  macroeconomic stabilization. The
ability  of  this  government  to  control  key  fiscal  and  monetary  variables  is
crucial  for  the  success  of  macroeconomic policies.  In  any  federation,  this
ability  can  be  potentially undermined  by  the  existence  of  other  layers  of
government  with  which  the  federal  government  must  share  powers  and
responsibilities. Thus  a  careful  study  of  the  mechanisms of  intergovernmental
relations is needed to address this issue.
The  profound changes undergone in  the  mechanisms for  intergovernmental
relations  in  Brazil  have  had  a  differentiated  impact  on  the  federal
government's  ability  to  conduct  stabilization policies.  On  the  one  hand,  it
seen,  that  the conditions for  macroeconomic  management via  fiscal policy have
deteriorated;  on  the  other  hand,  the  federal  control  over  monetary  policy
appears  to  have  improved.  These  points  seem  to  be  confirmed  by  the
stabilization  plan being currently undertaken  by the federal government.
Decentralization is  the  dominant characteristic of  the  newly  implemented
Brazilian  system  of  tax  and  expenditure assignments and  intergovernmental
transfers.  As  a  consequence,  this  paper  finds  three  basic  inter-relatedproblems concerning the  conduct of  fiscal  policy:  (i)  the  federal  government
has  lost  considerable control  over  some  fiscal  policy  instruments; (ii)  the
I
effectiveness of  the  instruments that  have  remained under  federal  jurisdiction
can  be  potentially undermined by  the  fiscal behavior of  the  lower  levels  of
government, and  (iii)  the  federal  government has  come under  a  fiscal squeeze
because transfers of  tax  assignments  and revenues have not been accompanied in
practice by a transfer of expenditure  responsibilities.
As  noted,  the  implications of  the  developments of  the  late  80s  for
monetary policy seem to  have been more favorable than the ones mentioned for
fiscal policy. Two  important events discussed in  the  paper that  helped enhance
the  federal  government's  ability  to  conduct a  sound  monetary  policy  are  (i)
the  end  of  the  "Monetary  Budget",  i.e.,  the  consolidation  of  the  federal
budget  into  one  single  budget  and  the  end  of  mechanisms that  effectively
allowed authorities to  use  the  printing press  of  the  Central Bank  to  finance
transfers  and  other  public  expenditures, and  (ii)  the  reduced  importance of
the  National Monetary Cuancil, i.e.,  the  new  Constitution vested a  more  clear
assignment of  monetary  policy  responsibility with  the  Central  Bank.  Despite
these  two  favorable  developments, however, this  paper  p(.nts  out  to  another
potential  obstacle  in  the  route  to  macroeconomic equilibrium  via  monetary
stabilization; this  can  be  found  in  the  nature  of  the  relations  among  the
Central  Bank  and  the  state  banking  institutions. The  recurrent  bail-outs  of
troubled  state  banks  by  the  federal  monetary  authorities  are  a  contributing
factor  to  monetary  instability  in  Brazil.  In  1987,  for  instarce,  nearly  one
half of  the  monetary base was constituted by  debt of  the  state banks with  the
Central Bank.
In  view of  the  above problems, the  following policy recommendations  may
be warranted:
*  Fiscal  Policy:  macroeconomic stabilization objectives  require  that  the
federal  government  be  freed  from  i.z  current  financial  strains.  Currentdifficulties  are  a  result  of  an  accumulation of  expenditure  responsibilities
at  the  center  which  is  incompatible with  the  new  disposition  of  revenues
across levels of  government and  of  the  federal  authorities lacking a  dynamic
source of finance. Thus it is recommended  that:
(i)  The  ongoing  transfer  of  expenditure  responsibilities to  states  and
municipalities  should be accelerated.
(ii) The Value Added Tax (VAT) which is currently being administered at
the  state level could  be  better administered by  the  federal government and  its
proceeds  shared  with  other  levels  of  government.  Tax  evasion  is  less
pervasive with  a VAT than with the federal income tax.
(iv)  There  is  a  growing  concern  that  municipalities  might  be  "free
riding"  on  the  generosity  of  federal  and  state  transfers  instead  of
undertaking unpopular  measures  concerning  the  collection  and  institution  of
local  taxes  and  fees  to  finance  their  own  expenditures.  Therefore  the
disbandment of  federal  transfers  to  municipalities and  their  substitution  by
state transfers is recommended.
Under  the  new  system of  intergovernmental fiscal relations in  Brazil,  the
success  of  fiscal  policy  depends  critically  upon  the  fiscal  behavior  of  the
lower  levels  of  government. The  importance  of  policy  cooperation  among
national and sub-national governments  can therefore be hardly overemphasized.
*  Monetary Policy:  The  frequent need  for  the  Ceintral Bank  to  bail-out
troubled  state  commercial  banks  is  an  important  source  of  monetary
instability. The  financial  problems  of  state  banks  are  largely  attributable to
their  excessive  allocation  of  loans  to  their  state  treasuries.  Thus  it  is
recommended that  the  federal  monetary  authorities  adopt  stricter  regulations
and  monitoring of  the  portfolio  allocations of  commercial state  banks.  Clear
guidelines  should  be  instituted  for  these  banks'  loans  to  their  respective
state treasuries.1. Introduction
An  inherent feature  of  contemporaneous  economies is  the  high  degree of
variability  in  their  aggregate  output  levels.  Identifying  the  sources  of  this
variability,  as  well  as  suggesting effective  remedies  for  its  cure,  is  at  the
heart of  modern macroeconomic  theory. Within this framework, a  very  common,
though  by  no  means  general,  belief  is  that  the  government  should  play  an
active  role  in  trying  to  minimize  the  extent  of  such  fluctuations.
Accordingly, it  should make use of  the  fiscal and  monetary policy instruments
at  its  disposal to  try  to  stimulate more production when output performance is
poor,  and  exert  its  powers  to  discourage production  when  the  economy  is
over-heated.
An  effective  implementation of  stabilization policies  requires  control  by
the  government over  taxes, public expenditures, and  the  money supply so  that
the  necessary adjustments in  these variables could  be  made in  ways  consistent
with  stabilization objectives.  Whether  or  not  policy  . ers  actually  control
these  variables  is  a  non-trivial  question  that  becomes  particularly  relevant
in  a  federation.  This  is  so  because,  in  federal  systems,  policy  makers'
control  over  instruments  of  policy  risk  becoming  too  diluted  among  the
different  levels  of  government --It  might  well  be  the  case  that  no  single
level  of  government  retains  a  degree  of  control  necessary  for  the
implementation  of the stabilization  policies alluded to above.
This  paper examines how recent changes in  the  division of  powers among
federal,  state,  and  local  governments in  Brazil  have  affected  the  conditions
for macroeconomic  management  in  that country. This examination gains an added
significance given  that  the  erratic  character of  macroeconomic performance in
Brazil has often been blamed on macroeconomic  mismanagement.  The focus in thispaper  is  on  how  federal  control  of  the  policy  variables  mentioned here  has
been affected by the latest developments  in Brazilian institutions.
Section  2  presents  a  brief  discussion  of  the  Brazilian  institutions
relevant for  the  analysis. A  framework for  analysis is  specified in  section  3.
This  framework is  used to  evaluate the current system in  section 4.  A  summary
of the paper and some policy recommendations  are presented in section 5.
2. Institutional  Setting
Within  the  Federal  Republic  of  Brazil  there  are  three  relatively
autonomous layers  of  government. The  federal  government is  located  in  the
Federal  District  where  Brasilia, the  nation's  capital,  was  built  in  1"60.  The
s-,cond layer  is  represented by  the  state  governments; there are  26  of  them  in
the  federation.  Finally,  more  than  4000  municipalities constitute  the  third
and  lowest  level  of  government. This  section  will  attempt  to  offer  some
insights  of  the  way  these  three  levels  of  government interact  on  issues  of
macroeconomic  management.
The  description of  intergovernmental relations  in  Brazil  undertaken  here
will cover two different perspectives: a  fiscal and a  monetary one.  Most works
in  this  area  deal  only  with  fiscal  issues; it  will  be  shown, however, that,  at
least  for  the  purposes of  this  paper, there  are  many  important aspects of  such
relations  that  are  deeply  related  to  the  Brazilian  m, netary  system.  These
aspects,  it  will  be  argued  later  on,  have  very  important  implications  for
monetary policy issues.
2.1  Fiscal Considerations
Three  main  questions concerning the  Brazilian federation are  of  interest
here. The  first  two  are  related to  the  distribution of  taxing power  and  public
2expenditure responsibility among the  different  layers  of  government. The  third
issue relates to the structure of intergovernmental  transfers in Brazil.
2.1.1  Tax Assignment
The  arrangements set  forth by  the  1988 Constitution imposed a  profound
change  in  the  allocation  of  taxing  power  across  the  three  levels  of
government. Under the  new regime, there has been a  remarkable transfer of  tax
assignments  from the federal to state and local governments.
The  trend  towards  decentralizadion of  taxing  responsibilities  is  best
illustrated by  the  changes that  took  place in  the  domain of  the  general value
added tax  (VAT). Pre-1988 arrangements  empowered the  federal government with
the  ability  to  levy  special  taxes  on  communications, fuels,  electric  power,
minerals, and  transports. According to  the  new  settings, however, all  of  these
five  separate taxes  have  been  abolished,  their  bases  being  transferred to  the
state level VAT (the so-called ICMS).
Other  changes  characterizing the  new  division  of  taxing  powers  in  the
Brazilian  federation  are  (i)  the  authorization  to  states  to  levy  a
supplemental rate  of  up  to  5%  on  the  federal  income tax  base;  and  (ii)  the
implemnentation  of  new  municipal  taxes  on  the  retail  sale  of  fuels  and  on
transfers of real estate and property between living persons.
Table  1  shows  the  historical  evolution  of  tax  collections by  level  of
government. In  1988,  tax  collections by  the  federal  government  fell  below
50% of total tax revenues for the first time in twenty years.
Shah  (1990)  has  examined  the  implications  of  the  1988  fiscal  arrangements
for  efficiency  and  equity  of  public  service  provision  in  Brazil.  The  analysis
here  will be  limited to  the implications for macroeconomic  management
3Table 1
SRAZIL: TAX REVENUE  COLLECTION  BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
Year  Shares  (t,
Union  States  Municipalities  Al
1957  48.1  43.3  8.0  100.0
1958  53.3  41.2  7.5  100.0
1959  49.0  44q.0  6.4  100.0
1960  995  44.5  6.0  100.0
1961  49.5  4.6  5.9  100.0
1962  49.2  44.5  6.3  100.0
1963  51.0  42.5  6.5  100.0
1964  48.8  44.8  6.5  100.0
1965  50.7  42.5  6.8  100.0
1966  51.3  41.4  7.3  100.0
1967  15.8  49.4  *  4.8  100.0
1968  51.5  44.7  3.8  100.0
1969  53.7  42.7  3.7  100.0
1970  54.4  41.9  3.7  100.0
1971  56.4  40.0  3.6  100.0
1972  58.3  37.8  3.8  100.0
1973  58.5  37.7  3.8  100.0
1974  59.8  36.9  3.8  100.0
1975  59.0  37.0  4.1  100.0
1976  62.3  33.1  4.6  100.0
1977  60.9  34.0  5.2  100.0
1978  58.2  36.1  5.7  100.0
1979  58.3  35.9  5.9  100.0
1980  58.7  36.2  5.1  100.0
1981  58.2  36.7  5.1  100.0
1982  57.2  37.6  5.2  100.0
1983  57.8  37.0  5.2  100.0
1984  56.9  38.6  4.5  100.0
1985  57.6  38.3  4.1  100.0
1986  53.5  42.2  4.3  100.0
1987*  54.2  41.6  4.2  100.0
1988*  47.1  49.4  3.6  100.0
*  Preliminary  data
Shahcez  s  Uq  (1w))
42.1.2  Expenditure  Responsibility
A  noteworthy  feature  of  the  pre-1988  system  of  public  spending
responsibilities  was  the  "entralization  of  authority  in  the  hands  of  the
federal  government. Even  functions of  a  purely  local  nature  such  as  urban
infrastructure and  elementary education were being financed and  carried  out  by
Brasilia. In  this  matter,  the  main  contribution of  the  new  Constitution comes
in  the  form  of  a  clear  assignment of  expenditure responsibility across  levels
of  government in  a  way  that  is  broadly  consistent with  the  decentralization
trend  noted  above.  This  division  of  responsibilities, however,  has  left  a
large  array  of  functions under  the  common jurisdiction of  federal  and  state
govemments and  has  not  addressed the  issue  of  how  to  effectively carry  out
the  proposed  transfers  of  spending  assignment,  to  sub-national govemments. 2
in  fact,  .he  general  perception  is  that  the  decentralization  of  tax
assigtiments has  not  yet  been  followed by  the  corresponding shift  of  public
spending  responsibilities  to  the  lower  levels  of  government. 3 This  has
exacerbated  the  current  crisis  of  the  federal  biudget and  led  Brasflia  to
attempt  to  start  transferring  spending  responsibilities  to  states  and
municipalities --this  attempt  has  been  called  Opera ao  Desmonte. As  part  of
this  operation, in  1989, the  federal  government proposed to  transfer  spending
responsibilities  by  reducing  federal  intergovernmental allowances  for  social
programs. This  initiative, however, faced  strong  opposition of  state  governors
and mayors and was not approved by Congress.  Thus, in  that same year, Operacao
2
One  night  argue  that  such  lack  of  details  might  be  appropriate  for  a
Constitution,  specially  those  in  the  Anglo-American  tradition,  but  the  general
treatment  given  to  intergovemmental  spending  responsibilities  stands  out  as  a
clear  exception  in  tde  Brazilian  Constitution  which  covers  a  diverse  number  of
topics,  such  as  tax  assignment  and  intergovemmental  transfers,  in  great
length.
3
See  Tribunal  de  Contas  da  Uniao  (1988;  p.  20),  Afonso  and  Rezende  (1990;
p-10).  Afonso  and  Serra  (1989;  p.38-39),  Afonso  (1989,  May;  p.40),  and  Longo
(1987; p.24-25).
5Desmon  was basically implemented through the reduction, or  even  the  outright
elimination,  of  some  federal  intergovernmental  transfers  not  explicitly
specified  by  the  Constitution, especially the  negotiated transfers.  Much  more
can be done in  this area however given that such transfers took .96% of GDP in
1987. 4
2.1.3  Fiscal Transfers
Given  that  the  revenues  from  the  assigned  and  shared  taxes  and  the
financial  outlays  associated  with  the  expenditures  responsibilities  are  not
likely  to  be  compatible  for  the  different  levels  of  government,
intergovernmental transfers  will  have  to  play  an  important  role  in  any
federation. This  is  indeed the  case  in  Brazil. Table  2  shows the  evolution of
the  disposition of  revenues by  level of  government in  that  country  after  the
revenue  sharing  and  intergovernmental tax  transfer  schemes  are  taken  into
account. As  the  table  shows, the  last  ten  years are  marked by  an  increasing
decentralization  of public re;enues.5
The  trend  towards  decentralization is  more  evident  for  fiscal  transfers
than  for  any  other  aspect  of  Brazilian  intergovernmental relations.  This  is
illustrated by  the  revenue  sharing mechanisms for  the  Income Tax  (IR).  Even
though  this  is  basically a  federal  tax,  the  new  Constitution specifies  that,
when the new system is  fully implemented in  1993, the federal government will
have  to  transfer nearly  half  (47%) of  its  IR  proceeds to  state  and  municipal
governments. Decentralization of  revenues becomes even  more  evident with  the
federal tax on industrial products (IPI) tax; only 43% of  the  proceeds  from
Afonso  (1989)  pp.  37-38  Afonso  and  Rezende  (1990)  pp.  10-11.
This  is  a  result  of  both  the  decentralization  of  tax  assignments,  discussed
in  sub-section  2.1.1..  and  the  changes  that  culminated  with  the  implementation
of  the  new  systen  of  revenue  sharing  and  intergovernmental  transfers.
6Table  2
BRAZIL: FINAL DISPOSITION OF  REVENUES BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
Year  Revenue  Shares
Union  States  Municipalities  All
1957  42.7  46.0  11.3 - 100.0
1958  45.7  44.7  9.5  100.0
1959  43.3  47.9  8.9  100.0
1960  43.2  48.2  8.5  100.0
1961  41.8  49.7  8.6  100.0
1962  39.6  48.9  11.5  100.0
1963  41.9  46.0  12.0  100.0
1964  39.6  48.5  11.9  100.0
1965  39.0  48.1  12.9  100.0
1966  40.6  46.3  13.1  100.0
1967  36.9  45.2  17.9  100.0
1968  40.6  42.6  16.9  100.0
1969  45.8  39.8  14.4  100.0
1970  45.7  39.6  14.7  100.0
1971  47.7  38.4  13.9  100.0
1972  49.7  36.5  13.8  100.0
1973  49.1  37.1  13.7  100.0
1974  50.2  36.2  13.6  100.0
1975  50.3  36.0  13.7  100.0
1976  51.4  34.4  14.3  100.0
1977  50.2  34.8  15.0  100.0
1978  47.3  36.7  16.0  100.0
1979  47.5  36.3  16.2  100.0
1980  49.3  35.5  15.2  100.0
1981  49.2  34.8  15.9  100.0
1982  48.0  35.7  16.3  100.0
1983  48.4  35.2  16.4  100.0
1984  46.8  36.5  16.7  100.0
1985  44.7  37.5  17.8  100.0
1986  39.5  40.7  19.9  100.0
1987  42.5  38.6  18.8  100.0
1988*  33.4  50.7  15.9  100.0
1993**  36.5  40.7  22.8  100.0
*  Preliminary  data
**  Estimate
7this  tax  actually stay  in  the  hands  of  the  central  authorities.  6  For  the  taxes
associated with  royalties  for  mineral  extraction and  hydroelectricity, only  5%
stays  with  the  federal  government. Other  shared  taxes  are  the  ones  on
financial operations and  insurance and  on  rural  property. At  this  point,  it  is
important  to  note  that  the  federal  government has  no  participation in  the
proceeds of the general state value added tax.
Tax  transfers are  just  one  mechanism of  the  system of  intergovernmental
transfers  in  Brazil.  Another  important  characteristic of  this  system  is  the
significant  role  played  by  the  so-called  non-Constitutional transfers.  These
are,  as  the  name  suggests,  transfers  not  explicitly  specified  in  the
Constitution and  usually  not  directly  related  to  any  specific  tax.  A  large
proportion  of  these  transfers,  40%  in  1987,  can  be  classified  as
"negotiated." 7 These  are  obtained  through  direct  bargaining  between  federal
and  state/local  governments and  the  results  of  such  negotiations are  often
determined by non-economic  considerations.  8
The paper now proceeds to  describe some aspects of  the intergovernmental
relations  in  Brazil  that  go  beyond  the  standard  fiscal  considerations listed
above and are not always fully discussed in this literature.
6
The  real  magnitude  of  such  transfers  is  further  stressed  by  Act  104-A  of
1989  that  imposed  on  the  federal  govemment  strict  deadlines  for  the  delivery
of  IR  and  IPI  funds  committed  to  states  and  municipalities  (see  Camara  dos
Deputados  (1989)).  T'his  Act  came  to  address  the  long  standing  complains  of
govemors  and  mayors  that  Brasilia  was  benefiting  by  delaying  the  release  of
their  entitlements  from  the  revenue  sharing  schemes  and  not  paying  any
monetary  correction  on  the  original  amount  (see  Castro  (1989)).  Under  the
current  set  up,  not  only  the  lower  levels  of  government  are  receiving  a  larger
share  of  the  pie,  but  also  the  erosion  of  their  receipts  by  inflation,  the
Oliveira-Tanzi  effect  (Oliveira  (1967)  and  Tanzi  (1978)),  has  been
considerably  reduced  by  Congressional  directive.  On  the  other  side  of  the
coin,  the  federal  govemment  is  faced  with  two  additional  burdens:  increased
transfers  to  states  and  municipalities  and  limited  opportunities  to  extract




See Shah  (1990  p.  53).
82.2  Monetary Policy Considerations
Because of  the  many  ways  by  which  the  different levels of  government
interact  in  the  Brazilian  money  and  banking  system,  any  study  of  the
macroeconomic implications of  the  new  system of  intergovernmental  relations in
Brazil  must  include  at  least  a  description  of  this  country's  monetary
arrangements.
The  New  Brazilian  Constitution  establishes  that  among  the  items
upon  which  the  federal  govemment  has  the  exclusive  power  to  legislate
are: 9
a.  authorization  for  the  operation  of  financial  institutions,  insurance,
and capitalizations  companies;
b.  organization, operation and  duties  of  the  Central Bank, as  well as  the
requirements  for the appointment  of members  of its board of directors;
c. operation of credit cooperatives;
The above assignment implies that monetary policy is  the  exclusive domain
of  the  federal  govemment.  In  pursuit  of  this  objective,  the  federal
govemment retains  a  monopoly on  coinage and  currency  and  on  the  overall
regulation of  the  banking  and  financial  system. 10 There  are  however  many
aspects of  the  Brazilian money and  banking system on  which lower  levels of
govemment have  played an  important role.  These aspects are  discussed in  the
following sections.
2.2.1  Quasi-budgetary  role of the Central Bank
Under  the  previous constitutional arrangements, the  Central Bank  was  a
9
Article 22.
Ardcles 21 and  164 of  the  Federal Constimton.
9potential  direct  source  of  funds  for  the  financing  of  intergovernmental
transfers. This  was so  mainly due  to  two  factors: the  "Monetary Budget", and
the  predominance of  the  National Monetary Council views  on  the  conduct of
monetary policy."
The  Monetary  Budget:  Pre-1987  public  budgeting  practices  in  Brazil
segmented  the  federal  budget  into  three  different  parts:  the  Fiscal  Budget,
the  Public  Enterprises Budget,  and  the  Monetary Budget.  The  focus  of  the
present section is on the peculiar nature of the latter.
The  Monetary Budget  was  administered by  the  executive  branch  of  the
federal  government  through  the  Central  Bank  and  the  Bank  of  Brazil.
Expenditures determined in  this budget were mainly carried out by  the  Bank of
Brazil and  mostly financed through new  issues of  paper money by  the  Central
Bank. Financial assistance to  local and  state governments were among the  main
categories of  expenditures  included in  these mechanisms. 12  The Monetary Budget
was  not  restricted by  the  same  legislative limitations imposed  on  the  Fiscal
budget. It  could easily be used  to  finance expenditures not  programmed in  the
latter.  The  budgeting  decisions  were  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  National
Monetary Council to which the discussion now turns.
The  National  Monetary  Council  (CMN):  Another  way  by  which
intergovernmental relations could  potentially influence the  money and  banking
system  in  Brazil  was  through  the  deliberations of  the  National  Monetary
Council. This  institution was  created  in  1964  by  Law  No.  4959/64.13 It  had
general  responsibilities for  money  and  banking  policies.  In  the  pre-1988  set
it
A  third  indirect  factor  will  be  discussed  later.  This  is  the  nature  of  the
relations  between  the  official  banks  from  different  levels  of  govemment.
See  The  World  Bank  (1989,  June)  page  16.
13
See  The  World  Bank  (1984,  July;  p.  133).
10up,  its  members were the  Ministers of  Finance, Planning, Agriculture, Housing
and  Urban Development, Industry and  Commerce, Interior, Labor, the  president
of  the  Central Bank,  the  chairmen of  several other  banks,  and  other  private
sector  representatives. The  Council  was  chaired  by  the  Minister  of  Finance.
The CMN played such a predominant role in  the conduct of monetary policy that
it  took  many  of  the  responsibilities commonly attributed to  a  Central  Bank
such as  the monitoring of  the aggregate money supply and the implementation  of
interest  rate  policies.  Moreover,  the  Council  also  assumed  an  increasingly
quasi-fiscal role  by  making  extensive  use  of  its  prerogatives to  meet  short
term  priorities  on  the  determination  of  federal  expenditures  in  general,
including  intergovernmental transfers  and  subsidies.14 This,  of  course,  was
made possible by the existence of the monetary budget.
The  promulgation of  the  new  Constitution in  1988  has  introduced some
important  changes  in  the  ties  between  intergovernmental relations  and  the
monetary  system  in  Brazil.  In  1987,  while  the  Constitution was  still  being
drafted, the above mentioned Monetary Budget was replaced by the Credit Budget
which is  now issued as an annex to  the Annual Budget that has to  be submitted
to  Congress and  whose expenditures have  to  obey  the  standard budgetary and
legislative practices. 15 Given  that  the  new  constitutional order  prevents  the
Central Bank from issuing new money to  directly finance public expenditures. 16
the  Credit  Budget  is  basically  an  account  of  the  credit  operations of  the
federal government.
14  -By  1982,  58%  of  the  domestic  financial  assets  of  the  monetary  authorities
originated  frnn  quasi-fiscal  activities....  Transfers  of  funds  mobilized  by
the  monetary  authorities  played  a  role  similar  to  that  of  tax  transfers  in  the
allocation  of  resources  in  the  Brazilian  economy."  (The  World  Bank,  1984,
February; pp 42-43.)
15
See  Secretaria do  Tesouro Nacional (1988) VoL I  p.  117-118.
16
Federal Constitution article 164. paragraph 1.
11Another  very  important  implication  of  the  new  Constitution  to  the
intergovernmental relations/monetary system  link  is  the  limited  scope  that  the
new order left to  the  National Monetary Council. Nowadays, the  Ministry of  the
Economy and the  Chairman of  the Central Bank are formally responsible for the
conduct of  monetary policy and  have  been  limited in  their  ability  to  act  as
direct quasi-fiscal agents.
2.2.2  Intergovernmental  Relations in the Official Banking System
Many  important aspects  of  the  intergovernmental relations  in  Brazil  are
hidden  in  the  official  banking  system,  i.e.,  the  interactions among  federally
owned banks and state banks.
The  relative  size  of  the  state  banking  system  in  Brazil  gives  enough
reasons  to  guarantee  the  inclusion  of  such  topic  in  this  discussion  of
intergovernmental  relations  and  macroeconomic  management.  One  cannot
underestimate the  importance of  the  official  banking  system  in  Brazil:  in
1988, out  of  this  country's  103  commercial banks, 24  were  owned  by  state
governments.  In the same year, these banks held 23% of  all demand deposits and
made 28% of all commercial  bank loans. 17
One  remarkable  characteristic of  state  banks  that  clearly  differentiates
them from commercial private banks is  the  large degree of  dependence of  the
former on  federal sources of  funds. The predominant role played by  the  Central
Bank  and  other  federal credit  institutions in  the  financing of  these  funds  can
be  seen  in  table  3.  As  this  table  shows,  "about  three-fourths  of  state
commercial banks funds are provided by  loans from the  Central Bank and other
federal agencies." Moreover,  in  1987, state commercial  banks'  debt  with  the
17
See The World Bank (1989, November. p.  2)
12Table 3
STATE COMMERCIAL  BANKS AND FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT
Borrowings  from  Debt with Central Bank/
Federal Govemment/  Mon_wy Base
Total Domestic Funding
(Percent)
JUN/83  69  2
DEC/83  70  8
JUN/84  71  9
DEC/84  72  30
JUN/85  71  46
DEC/85  65  21
JUN/86  55  10
DEC/86  52  8
JUN/87  71  49
DEC/87  73  49
Source: The World Bank (1989, November)
13Central Bank totaled half of the monetary base. 18
The  nature  of  these  intergovernmental relations  in  the  banking  system
becomes even  more important when one  analyzes the  financial health of  many
state  banks  in  the  last  decade.  Since  the  early  eighties,  these  banks  have
been  experiencing  recurrent  crises  with  potential  destabilizing  factors  for
the  entire  banking system. That  has led  the  Central Bank to  take  actions that
range  from  direct  intervention to  waivers of  required  reserves.  One  of  the
effects of  these  periodic bail-outs is  an  increase on  the  already large  degree
of  dependence  of  state  banking  institutions  on  their  federal  counterparts
making this  an  even  more  important channel for  intergovernmental  relations in
Brazil.
3. Framework  of Analysis
This  section  describes the  concepts that  will  be  used  as  the  basis  for
evaluations  and  for  developing  recommendations concerning  the  institutions
described in section 2.
The  starting point  of  the  current analysis is  that  the  government has  an
important role  to  play  in  the  stabilizatio.- of  both  output  and  prices.  Thus,
assuming that  macroeconomic stabilization by  the  government is  feasible  and
desirable, which level of  government should have  the  primary responsibility of
fulfilling such  function? In  the  division of  powers and  allocations among  the
three levels of  government of  a  federation, which one  should be  ultimately in
charge of carrying out macroeconomic  management?
3.1 Stabilization  as a Public Good
Idem pp 5-7.
14It  is  within  the  framework  of  public  finance  theory  that  the  most
relevant  discussion  of  the  topics  introduced  above  can  be  found. 19 The
treatment given  by  this  theory to  issues of  macroeconomic management is  best
understood if  one  is  reminded of  the  public good  nature of  output  and  price
stabilization. If  such  stabilization is  provided,  it  will  be  available  to  all,
regardless  of  who  bears  the  costs  of  implementing it;  therefore,  no  single
individual might  have  the  incentive, or  maybe even  the  ability,  to  exert  any
effort  towards macroeconomic stabilization. Thus,  this  is  a  role  that  must  be
played by the  government.  The question is: which government? Should the public
good  of  macroeconomic stabilization be  provided by  the  federal, the  state,  or
the local government?
As  regards  the  allocation of  public  good  provision  responsibility  in  a
federation,  Wallace Oates (1972, p.55) has argued that:
"Each  public  service  should  be  provided  by  the  jurisdiction
having  control  over  the  minimum geographic area  that  would
internalize benefits and costs of such provision"
Even  by  i. eir  own  name  --macro  is  Greek  for  large--  macroeconomic
policies  have  a  scope  which  can  be  potentially  larger  than  that  of  any
sub-national government. Given  the  increasing integration of  today's  markets,
inflationary  pressures  in  any  individual  state,  will  most  likely  be
transmitted  to  the  rest  of  the  nation  --inflation  by  itself  is  generally
treated as  a  national phenomenon.  Accordingly, even though unemployment rates
may vary  from state to  state, more severe unemployment and  deeper recessions
tend  to  be  events  of  a  national  scope.  These  spatial  spillovers  are  also
reflected  in  the  implementation of  policies  aimed  at  economic  stabilization.
Suppose  that  a  state  is  contemplating  the  possibility  of  unilaterally
See  especially  Musgrave  and  Musgfave  (1973).  Oates  (1972),  and  Courchene
(1986).
15increasing  tax  rates  in  order  to  curb  inflationary  pressures.  Even  if  such
measure were to  succeed in  bringing down inflation, it  would be very  unlikely
that  any  individual state  would  actually do  it  on  its  own.  For  an  individual
state,  the  benefits from  achieving lower  rates  of  inflation  would  very  likely
be  more  than  offset  by  the  losses  due  to  a  possible outflow of  productive
factors to  other  states with  a  more  favorable tax  system. In  other  words, this
state  would  have  to  bear  alone all  the  costs  of  bringing Jown  inflation, but
would  enjoy  only  a  share of  the  corresponding benefits since these  will  spill
out to the rest of the federation.
The  situation just  described  fits  well  within  the  discussion  of  spatial
externalities.  Spatial  externalities  arise  when  benefits  and/or  costs  of
public  services  are  realized  by  non-residents.  In  the  case  of
benefit-spillout, the  jurisdiction  providing  the  service  does  not  consider  the
proportion  of  benefits  of  a  public  service  accruing  to  non-residents  and
therefore would under-provide such  service. As  a  corollary, this  service would
be  best  provided by  the  government at  the  highest  level i.e.  by  the  federal
government. 20
If  macroeconomic stabilization is  interpreted as  a  service being  provided
by  the  government, the  preceding discussion provides  a  strong  argument  for
federal  provision  of  this  service.  Macroeconomic management  should  be
primarily  carried  out  by  the  center  because  it  is  this  layer  of  government
that  controls  "the  minimum geographic area  that  intemalize the  benefits and
costs"  associated  with  its  provision.  This  "minimum  geographic  area"  is
nothing  short  of  the  entire  nation.  Given  the  presence  of  the  spatial
extemalities, local  pursuit of  such a  policy would lead to  much of  the  gains
20 See Shah (1990, p.6).
16being lost to outside jurisdictions. 2'
3.2  Federal Control over Policy Instruments
Given  that  theoretical  consideratiorcs  warrant  that  macroeconomic
stabilization be  carried  out  by  the  federal  government, the  conditions for  an
effective  implementation of  such  function  crucially  depend  on  the  central
authorities'  ability  to  exert  control  over  key  policy  instruments. These  are
the  variables  related  to  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  --taxes  and  public
spending for the former, and the aggregate money supply for the latter.
If  taxes,  public  spending,  and  the  money  supply  are  perceived  as
important  determinants of  economic  activity, then  there  should  exist  enough
flexibility in  the  hands  of  the  federal  government so  it  can  alter  any  of
these  variables as  the  state  of  the  economy requires. By  flexibility, however,
it  is  meant  not  just  the  power  to  change these  variables, as  defined  by  the
legal  environment,  but  also  the  practical  feasibility  of  undertaking  such
changes.  As  an  example, consider  the  case  of  fiscal  policy;  it  is  true  that
its  success greatly depends on  how much of  the  taxes and  public spending are
commanded  by  the  federal  government,  but  it  is  also  true  that  these
instruments cannot  be  used  if  other  important factors  are  out  of  line.  A
factor  that  deserves  special  attention  is  the  size  of  the  federal  debt  and
22 deficit.  If  it  is  the  case  that  the  deficit  is  already  intolerably high,  the
fact  that  the  federal  authorities  exert  full  control  over  taxes  and  public
spending  will  be  of  little  help  in  times  of  recession.  The  use  of  either
21
Ibid p.  7.
22
Other  facton  that  may  also  impair  the  effective  use  of  fiscal  policy
instnmnents  are  indexation  of  wages  and  public  debt.  This  is  so  because  both
wages  and  debt  seivice  reprsent  a  large  share  of  fede, !  expenditumes  and
their  indexation  imnposes  additional  consraints  upon  the  federal  budgetL
Currendy,  however  the  federal  govemment  is  engaged  in  putting  an  end  to  the
official indexation of  wages as  weU as  in  reducing the size of  iu  deficit.
17policy  tool  would  imply  in  an  even  larger  deficit  and  that  might  not  be
feasible  or  desirable.23 In  other  words,  the  size  of  the  deficit  can  put  a
check  on  the  flexibility  necessary for  the  implementation of  macroeconomic
management.  This  is  a  point  that  will  be  particularly  relevant  for  a
discussion concerning Brazilian institutions.
3.3  Conclusions
Three main conclusions  can be derived from earlier discussion.
(i)  In  the  division of  powers among the  different layers  of  government,
macroeconomic management  should  be  primarily  performed  by  the  federal
government;
(ii)  An  effective  implementation of  macroeconomic management requires
some  federal  control  over  the  national  tax  system,  over  the  allocation  of
public spending, and over monetary variables;
(iii)  The  size  of  the  federal  deficit  should  be  kept  within  certain
limits if macroeconomic  management  is to become feasible.
These  three  results  will  constitute  the  general  guideline  for  this
paper's  evaluation of  the  conditions for  macroeconomic management in  the
Brazilian federation.
4. Evaluation
The  theoretical  notions  just  discussed  imply  that  macroeconomic
stabilization is  primarily  a  responsibility of  the  federal  government. In  the
following, an  exarrination of  how the new  system of  intergovernmental  relations
23  Cleady,  this  dilemma  would  not  exist  if  the  problem  were  to  alleviate
fidlationary  pressures.  Then,  an  increase  in  taxes  and/or  a  decrease  in
federl  spending  would  help  achieve  both  lower  deficits  and  greater
macroeconomic  stability.
18in  Brazil  has  affected the  ability of  the  federal  government to  carry  out  its
basic functions in  macroeconomic  management is  undertaken. This  is  indeed the
central concern of this paper.
4.1  Fisc,! Policy
4.1.1  Control over expenditures
The  overall  redisaibution  of  fiscal  revenues  from  the  federal  to  state
and  local governments imposed by  the  new Constitution has reinforced the  trend
towards  the  decentralization of  expenditure responsibilities. The  best  example
24 of  this phenomenon is  provided by Operacao Desmonte.  Its  objective is  clearly
one  of  making expenditure responsibilities compatible with  the  revenue sharing
mechanisms made explicit by  the  new Constitution. Although certainly desirable
from  a  public  finance  point  of  view,  this  shift  of  expenditure
responsibilities  has  potentially  detrimental  implications  for  the  federal
government's menu  or  fiscal policy instruments. It  is  estimated that,  in  1988,
only 43% of public expenditures  were under federal government  control.25
Though  certainly  relevant,  the  share  of  total  public  spending  directly
under  the  control  of  the  federal  governmente  is  just  one  factor  to  be
considered when assessing the  effectiveness of  changes in  government spending
as  an  instrument for  macroeconomic stabilization. Another relevant issue  to  be
examined is  the  question of  to  what extent and  in  which direction the  lower
levels  of  government would  be  willing  and  able  to  react  to  changes  in  the
See page 5  in this paper.
Shah (1990; p.  21)
26  Within  this  share,  it  is  impoutant  to  distinguish  between  discretionary  and
non-discretionary  federal  spending.  in  the  latter,  it  is  included  the
constitutionally  mandated  spending  programs  such  as  the  ones  on  education.
Clearly,  the  former  is  the  one  with  more  impontance  for  fiscally  based
matcroeconomic  stabilization.
19level  of  federal  govermnent's  expenditures. Suppose,  for  instance,  that  the
federal  government  decides  to  engage  on  an  expansionary increase  in  its
expenditures. Would that  lead  lower levels  of  government to  engage  in  some
sort  of  free-riding behavior and  in  turn  decrease their  own  expenditures? To
what  extent  would  that  be  a  plausible  situation and  under  which  conditions
would  that  offset  the  effects  of  the  discretionary  change  in  federal
expenditures?
Regardless of  tIhe answers to  the  hypothetical questions above, one  major
result  stands out  conceming the  effectiveness of  government expenditures as  a
policy instrument: the  new constitutional framework has  not  made  it  easier to
implement  fiscal  stabilization  policies  based  on  changes  in  government
expenditures. The  new  system  requires  a  substantial degree  of  coordination
between  Brasilia  and  at  least  the  major  state  governments. There  is  no
guarantee  that such coordination  could be feasible or enforceable. 27
4.1.2  Control of tax rates and tax bases
Even if  the  new  Constitution has  limited the  effectiveness of  government
expenditures as  a  policy instrument for  macroeconomic management, that  does
not  mean  that  fiscal  policy per  se  has  been  rendered ineffective. Elementary
notions  of  macroeconomics would  tell  us  that  changes  in  the  level  of
government expenditures are  just  one  fiscal policy  instrument that  the  federal
government has at  its disposal. Another very  important tool  to  be  used  in  this
27
Anecdotal  evidence  from  the  most  current  stabilization  effon  (The  CoUor
Plan,  implemented  in  March  1990  and  stiU  under  way)  suggests  that,  in  many
cases,  states  may  not  be  wiUling  to  go  along  with  federal  measures.  Consider
the  case  of  the  proposed  lay-off  of  more  than  200  thousand  public  servants.
This  is  perceived  as  a  way  to  address  the  current  crisis  of  govenmmental
finances  in  Brazil  Even  though  this  caisis  is  certainly  generalized  to  all
layers  of  govemment,  there  was  little  that  Brasilia  could  do  in  terms  of
inducing  state  govemon  to  adopt  similar  measures.  The  burden  of  the
unpopular  policy  was  felt  entirey  by  the  federal  governmenL  Presumably,  the
federl  adjustment  would  not  have  to  be  so  big,  had  state  govemmenu  also
taken their  share of  the effort
20area are taxes.
The new Constitution did move towards a  more decentralized system of tax
assignments as  section  2  above  showed:  however,  substantial  discretionary
power still  remains in  the  hands of  the  federal government. This  paper  argues
that  the  new  tax  system  has  mixed  implications for  the  effectiveness of
changes in  tax rates and tax bases as policy instruments.
On  one  hand, the  new Constitution has eliminated many federal taxes and
incorporated their  bases into the  state administered ICMS. By  the  same token,
it  has  given states  the  option of  levying supplemental rates  of  up  to  5%  on
the  federal  income  tax.  Reinforcing  this  tendency  towards  decentralization,
there  are  the  new  constitutional revenue  sharing  schemes  that  greatly  favor
states and municipalities  at the expense of the federal government.
On the  other hand, it  could be seen that one  of  the  most important fiscal
instruments  still  basically  remains  under  federal  jurisdiction.  This  is  the
determination of  the  income tax  base  and  rates.  It  is  true  that  the  federal
government barely keeps 50% of  the proceeds from-  this revenue source, but one
should be  aware  that  it  has  the  sole  responsibility of  determining rates  and
the  taxable  base.  This  gives  the  federal  government the  possibility  of  not
only  affecting  aggregate disposable  income,  and  therefore  aggregate  demand,
but  also  of  exerting direct  influence over  the  revenues and  fiscal behavior of
the  lower  levels  of  government who  end  up  receiving the  other  half  of  the
proceeds of this tax.
What might actually be  a  more interesting consideration is  the  extent of
interactions  between  revenue  collections  in  the  different  levels  of
government. Here,  as  in  the  analysis of  government expenditures, consider the
following possibility: suppose the  federal  government decides  to  implement a
discretionary income  tax  cut.  This  federal  tax  cut  will  have  a  potentially
significant effect  on  the  revenues of  state  and  local  governments given  their
21large  share  in  the  proceedings of  this  tax.  It  might  be  the  case  that  to
offset  this  substantial loss  in  revenues from  federal  sources, lower  levels  of
government might choose either to  increase taie rates and/or bases on  the  taxes
under  their  jurisdiction,  or  increase  their  tax  effort.28 The  sorts  of  state
and  local government reactions saggested here  would potentially undermine the
effectiveness of  taxes  as  a  fiscal policy instrument; however there  remains to
be seen the extent to which such undermining  would be significant.
Despite  the  qualifications discussed  above,  it  seems  plausible  to  say
that  the  new  Constitution leaves  substantial room  for  an  effective  use  of
changes in income tax rates and bases as a means of implementing  macroeconomic
management.  Although  there  is  the  possibility  of  partial  undermining  of
federal  policies  by  state  and  local  governments,  cooperation,  or  even
inaction,  by  lower  levels  of  government can  still  be  considered as  possible
outcomes.
4.1.3  The Federal Debt
The  theoretical framework discussed in  section  3  introduced the  size  of
the  federal  debt  as  an  important factor  when  considering the  conditions for
macroeconomic management. Therefore, the  implications of  the  new  Brazilian
system of  intergovernmental relations to  the  size  of  the  federal  debt  have  to
be  well  understood  before  drawing  any  final  evaluation  of  the  current
situation. Here  there  are  important consequences both  on  the  expenditure and
the revenue side of the federal accounts.
Mahar  and  Dillnger  (1983)  have  pointed  out  that  the  low  yield  of  municipal
taxes  is  partially  explained  by  low  tax  effor.  More  recently,  there  is  an
increasing  concem  that  tax  effort  by  municipalities  might  have  gone  down  even
further  due  to  the  generosity  of  the  current  revenue  sharing  schemes.  (See
Shah  (1990)  and  Andrade  (1989)).  The  present  paper  claims  that  this  could
leave  local  govenmments  with  ample  maneuver  to  increase  tax  effort  in  times  of
federal tax cuts if  they so  desire.
22Implications  for  federal  expenditures:  As  shown  above,  the  new
Constitution has  reinforced  the  trend  towards  a  transfer  of  fiscal  resources
from the  federal to  the lower levels of  govemment. This measure would not  be
so  problematic for  the  federal budget if  it  were followed by  the  corresponding
transfer  of  spending  responsibilities  to  states  and  municipalities.  Even
though  the  new  Constitution  has  specified  in  detail  the  mechanisms of
intergovernmental fiscal  transfers,  it  has  not  explicitly  defined  rules  for
the  transfer  of  expenditure responsibilities. The  implications of  that  for  the
federal  budget  are  then  obvious. Brasilia has  lost  important revenue  sources,
but  still  faces  obligations  that  correspond  to  the  pre-1988  system.  Even
though  federal  officials have  been prompt  to  try  to  implement initiatives that
would  transfer  expenditure  assignments  back  to  state  and  local
governmPnts--the so-called  Operac,ao  Desmonte--  opposition  of  governors  and
mayors  has  put  the  federal  budget  under  substantial  pressure  and  with
increasingly  less room to engage in macroeconomic  management.
Implications  for  federal  revenues:  Another  important  factor  that  helps
increase  the  size  of  the  federal  debt  with  a  potentially  large  contribution
for  the  reduced  flexibility  of  federal  policy  makers  in  matters  of
macroeconomic stabilization is  the  limited  federal  access  to  more  productive
tax  bases. The  primary source  of  federal  revenues is  the  income  tax.  It  is
generally understood, however, that  such  a  tax  is  easier to  avoid  and  evade.
On  the  other  hand, the  value added  tax  is  considered as  a  more  productive
revenue  source.  . The  latter  tax  is  a  state  responsibility. Thus,  under  the
new  constitutional setup,  the  federal  authorities lack  a  more  productive  tax
that  would help  both  counteract the  debt  probiem and  render  more  flexibility
to the implementation  of fiscally-based  macroeconomic  stabilization.29
Shah  (1990)  has  advocated  the  tmnsfers  of  the  VAT  assignment  to  the  federl
jurisdiction  on  tax  administration  grounds  as  section  5  of  the  cufnent
234.2  Monetary  Policy
Two  basic  monetary policy  variables are  interest rates  and  the  monetary
base. The  discussion of  monetary policy will  differ  from  that  of  fiscal  policy
in  the  sense  that,  instead  of  discussing different  policy  tools,  it  will  only
be  considered how  the  monetary authority's  ability  to  effectively control  the
supply of  base money has been affected by  the new system of  intergovernmental
relations.  This  section  will  also  provide  a  brief  discussion of  the  division
of powers in the implementation  of incomes policies.
4.2.1  Control over Money Supply
As suggested by  the previous sections, the end of  the Monetary Budget and
of  the  dominant role played by  the National Monetary Council have contributed
significantly  to  more  transparency  in  the  intergovernmental  relations  in
Brazil.  The  scope  for  the  financing  of  negodated  transfers  was  further
diminished by  the  consdtudonal prohibition on  the  Central Bank's  issuing  of
new  money to  finance govemment expenditures.3 0 All  of  these changes in  the
links  between intergov.:nmental reladons  and  the  monetary system have  direct
implicatdons for  the  conduct of  stabilizatdon  policies  by  the  federal  monetary
authority.
Clearly the  fact  that  no  intergovernmental transfer, or  any  other  type  of
expenditure, can  any  longer be  financed through increases in  the  monetary base
adds  substantial maneuvering power in  the  hands of  the  Central Bank  for  the
purposes of  macroeconomic  management. It  is  no  longer the  case that short run
anysis  wil  briefly  discuss.  lhis  point  is  further  strngthened  in  this
paper based on macroeconomic  policy considerations.
See  article 168 of  the Federal Constitution.
24considerations of  the  National  Monetary  Council  should  necessarily override
long  run  stabilization  objectives.  Even  if  such  considerations  were  still
present, the  new  legal environment would not  allow  for  these and other  forms
of  pressures from interest groups and  lower levels of  government to  exert  as
much influence as what they could potentially  do in the previous regime.
Monetary stability  becomes paxticularly crucial  in  a  country  like  Brazil
where  a  return  to  two-digit annual inflation rates  would be  considered almost
a  blessing. In  this  sense, the  new  Constitution seems to  have  changed things
for  the  better.  Governors, mayors, and  other  rent-seeker groups  will  have  to
resort  to  other  souw  .s  for  the  financing  of  their  demands with  the  federal
government.
4.2.2  Has  the  quasi-budgetary  character of  the  Central Bank really  ended?
(Intergovernmental relations  in  the  official  banking  system--State
Banks)
The  above  discussion suggested a  significant improvement in  the  federal
govemment's ability to  conduct a  sound monetary policy. However, despite what
has  been  suggested elsewhere (The  World Bank, June  1989), the  end  of  the
Monetary Budget and  the  increased importance of  Central Bank over  Monetary
Council  authority  in  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  might  not  have
"effectively  terminated  the  Central  Bank's  role  as  a  quasi-fiscal  agent"
(p. iv).  Much more remains to  be changed if  the  goal is  to  really improve the
perspectives for  an  efficient  role  of  the  Central  Bank  in  macroeconomic
management.
What  the  account of  the  state  banking system suggests is  that  there  are
many  implicit transfers from  the  federal  to  state  governments that  take  place
25through  the  interactions  between  their  respective  official  banking
institutions.31 The  conspicuous  nature  of  such  transfers  is  certainly  not
desirable  from  a  public  finance  perspective.  Moreover,  heavy
state  bank  borrowing  from  the  Central  Bank  allows  states  to  effectively
participate  in  the  proceedings  of  the  inflation  tax  with  clearly  adverse
implications  for macroeconomic  stability. 32
Most  of  the  problems involving the  financial position  of  state  banks,  it
has  been  suggested, 33 have  their  roots  on  their  relation  with  their  respective
state governments.  In  the period 1983/87, between 70% and 80% of  state banks'
loans  were  made  to  their  state  governments. The  relative  proportion  has
actually tended to  increase over  the  period. These  loans  were mostly  directed
to  state  treasuries leaving  state  banks  as  virtual  financial branches  of  state
government  expenditures.
The  more  troubling  implications of  the  above  is  the  fact  that  this
concentration of  commercial state  bank loans  to  their  state  governments might
have  been  motivated  by  considerations other  than  the  technical  analysis  of
proposed projects  on  the  basis  of  their  profitability and  timing  of  expected
returns. State  governments have the  potential of  exerting substantial power on
the  portfolio  allocations  of  their  banks  and  that  the  financial  distress  of
many  state  governments might  have  had  a  substantial  contribution  to  the
similar problems faced by their banks.
The  World  Bank  estimates  that  in  the  period  between  August/88  and  May/89.
65%  of  all  transfers  to  Cediral  a  bank  owned  by  the  state  of  Minas  Gerais,
came  from  the  federal  govermment  and  that  an  equal  amount  was  passed  on  to  the
state  govermnent.  These  transfers  consisted  of  non-interest  bearing  deposits,
subsidized  loans  by  federal  agencies,  temporary  holdings  of  tax  proceeds,  and
participations  in  repasses-  (funds  on-lent  by  the  federl  government).  (The
World Bank, 1989, Novemnber  p.  22-25)
See the  World Bank (1989. November).
33
Idem.
26When the  Central Bank is  led  to  bail-out a  failing commercial state bank,
either  to  direct  intervendon, or  through  special loans  and  injections of  more
funds,  what  actually happens is  an  implicit transfer  from  the  federal  to  the
state  government. As  the  previous discussion showed, most of  the  funds passed
from  the  Central  to  a  state  bank  will  eventually  end  up  financing  state
expenditures --recall  that  more  than  three  fourths  of  state  commercial banks'
portfolio  is  credit  to  the  public  sector.  It  is  suggested  by  the  current
analysis that  such  a  system not  only  significantly impairs  the  transparency of
the  intergovernmental relations  in  Brazil,  but  could  potentially  be  used  to
avoid  constitutional  prohibition  on  the  direct  financing  of  government
expenditures through  the  printing  press  of  the  Central  Bank  with  obvious
effects for monetary stability.
Periodic  increases  in  the  monetary  base  caused  by  Central  Bank's
bail-outs of  failing  state  banks  have  been  an  important  source  of  monetary
instability and a  significant obstacle to  macroeconomic  management. What makes
this  issue  even  more  troubling  is  the  realizadon  that  there  has  been  an
increasing  deterioration  in  the  state  banks'  position  vis-a-vis  the  Central
Bank. According to  World Bank estimates, 34 state banks'  debt  to  Central Bank
amounted to  1% of  their liabilities in  1983; this proportion became 21% in  the
beginning of  1988. Furthermore, this  debt  to  the  Central Bank  accounted for
half of  the  monetary base  in  1987. The  potential contribution of  this  debt  to
the  inflation  rate  of  the  period  could  be  large,  especially  when  one  is
reminded  that  the  funds  provided by  the  Central  Bank  are  tumed  into  base
money and therefore have a multiplier effect on the aggregate money supply.
4.2.3  Incomes Policies
34
ibid.
27An  alternative way  to  enhance  monetary stabilization is  by  resorting to
incomes policies. These policies are defined as  government measures whose aim
is  to  directly  control  nominal  variables  --such  as  prices,  wages,  and
nominally denominated assets--  as  part  of  an  effort  to  lower  the  inflation
rate and  restore macroeconomic  equilibrium. These measures can  come either in
the  form of a  generalized wage and price freeze or  as a  more subtle monitoring
through  well  defined  ceilings  for  increases in  these  variables. The  inclusion
of  incomes  policies  in  this  discussion  of  intergovernmental relations  and
macroeconomic stabilization in  Brazil  is  warranted  by  the  frequent  use  that
policy makers of  that country have made of  such  policies. Since  1986, nearly
all  attempts  to  curb  the  country's  accelerating  rate  of  inflation  have
included some type of price and wage control, if not direct freeze.
The  current stabilization plan --implemented by  the  federal  government on
March  16,  1990-- can  appropriately illustrate both  the  popularity of  incomes
policies among  Brazilian policy  makers  and  the  little  degree  of  power  that
states  and  municipalities  enjoy  in  this  important  policy  instrument.  The
federal  government is  empowered with  the  exclusive  ability  to  impose  and
enforce price  and  wage control throughout the  nation leaving the  lower  layers
of  government with  no  option  other  than  abide  by  the  orders  coming  from
Brasilia. 5 The  impact  of  the  current  stabilizadon  effort  --which  not  only
froze  prices  and  wages,  but  also  a  large  share  of  the  country  financial
assets--  on  the  Brazilian  economy36 clearly  demonstrates  that  despite  the
35  'Me  new  Constitution  haa  empowered  the  federal  bmnch  of  the  federal
govermment  with  to  the  ability  to  decree  provisional  measumes  with  the  effect
of  law  in  caes  of  urgent  need.  These  measures  must  be  approved  by  Congress
and  converted  into  ordinary  law  within  30  days  or  they  cease  to  be  valid.
(Anicle  62)  It  was  through  such  provisional  measures  that  the  bulk  of  the
current  stabilization  plan  was  implemented.  States,  municipalites,  or  any
other  enity  can  be  barred  from  appealig  against  any  such  measures  as  it  was
the cas  with the Plan.
3  `lhe  Grter  Sao  Paulo  unemployment  rate  for  the  month  of  June  has  reached
28decentralization of  tax  and  expenditure assignments, much remains in  the  hands
of  the  federal government for sound macroeconomic  management, specially when
incomes policies  are  concerned. This  fact,  by  itself,  should  help  explain  at
least  partially  the  increasing  choice  of  incomes  policies  in  the  menu  of
federal  policy  instruments:  given  that  the  new  situation  might  not  have
improved  the  conditions for  the  use  of  certain  policy  instruments, such  as
taxes and  government expenditures, it  might be  rational to  emphasize the  use
of  those  tools  that  have  remained  under  federal  discretion,  such  as  the
implementation  of incomes policies and monetary control. 37
5. Summary  and Policy Recommendations
5.1  Introduction  and Basic Framework
The  erratic behavior of  the  Brazilian economy in  the  last  ten  years  has
been  increasingly attributed to  macroeconomic mismanagement.  Fiscal federalism
theory  reserves  to  the  federal  government  the  fundamental  role  in  the
performance of  macroeconomic stabilization. This  paper  has  analyzed how  the
conditions for  sound  economic management have  been  affected  by  the  new
division of  powers implied by  the  changes that  culminated with  the  new  1988
Brazilian Constitution.
5.2  Basic Findings
Mechanisms  for  intergovernmental relations  in  Brazil  have  undergone
profound changes  in  the  last  decade. These  changes  have  had  a  differential
12.1%,  the  highest  rate  since  1985...  real  wages  have  hit  their  lowest  levels
in  five  years  as  welL...  For  May.  mal  wages  feU  3%  among  wage-earne."
(Gazeta Merntil,  July 23,  1990)
See Bank of  Boston (1990).
29impact  on  the  federal  government's  ability  to  conduct  stabilization policies.
On  one  hand, it  seems that  the  conditions for  macroeconomic management via
fiscal  policy  might  have  deteriorated; on  the  other  hand,  the  present  account
suggests that  monetary policy may have regained more importance as  a  tool for
macroeconomic stabilization. A  summary of  the  implications for  each  set  of
policies follows.
5.2.1  Fiscal Policy Implications
Given  that  decentralization is  the  dominant  characteristic of  the  newly
implemented Brazilian  system  of  tax  assignment and  fiscal  transfers,  federal
policy-makers have  lost  some  control  over  basic  fiscal  policy  instruments.
Moreover,  even  the  effectiveness  of  those  instruments  that  have  basically
remained  under  federal  control  --such  as  the  income  tax  system--  can  be
potentially  impaired  by  strategic  behavior  on  the  part  of  state  and  local
governments.  The lower levels of  government now have much more maneuvering
power to  change their own  fiscal behavior in  response to  new  federal policies;
these responses might end  up  offsetting some of  the  intended effects of  these
policies.
What also  becomes an equally important issue to  consider when discussing
the  implications for  fiscal  policy  is  the  increasing degree  of  rigidity  that
the  new  system has  imposed on  the  federal  authorities. The  transfers of  both
tax  assignments and  tax  revenues to  the  lower levels of  government have  not
yet  been  followed  in  practice  by  the  corresponding shift  of  expenditure
responsibilities  from  the  center. 38 Therefore,  the  federal  government  finds
itself  overburdened  with  obligations  that  far  exceed  its  current  fiscal
38
Some  reduction  in  the  negotiated  intergovernmental  transfers  has  been
observed,  but  this  paper  has  pointed  out  that  the  relative  impact  of  these
reductions  is  smalL (See page 6  of  this paper.)
30resources  and  that  leave  it  with  little  or  no  room  for  fiscal  maneuvering
aimed  at  stabilization purposes.  In  other  words,  the  fiscal  authorities  lack
the  flexibility needed for  the  achievement of  macroeconomic management via
fiscal policy.
There  are  thus  three  basic  inter-related problems concerning the  conduct
of  fiscal  policy:  (i)  the  federal  government  has  lost  considerable  control
over  basic  fiscal  policy  instruments;  (ii)  the  effectiveness  of  the
instruments  that  have  remained  under  federal  jurisdiction  can  be  potentially
undermined by  the  fiscal behavior of  the  lower levels of  government, and  (iii)
the  federal government has come under a  fiscal squeeze because the  transfer of
tax  assignments and  revenues have  not  been  accompanied in  practice  by  a
transfer of expenditure  responsibilities.
5.2.2  Monetary Policy Implications
The  implications of  the  developments of  the  late  80s  for  monetary policy
seem  to  have  been  more  favorable  than  the  ones  mentioned  in  the  fiscal
considerations  above.  lTwo  important  events  helped  enhance  the  federal
government's ability to  conduct a  sound  monetary policy.  The  first  significant
change  took  place in  1987 while the  new Constitution was  still being  drafted;
this  was  the  end  of  the  Monetary Budget  and,  consequently, of  tne  direct
financing  of  federal  government  expenditures  and  transfers  through  the
printing press of  the  Central Bank. The  second change came in  the  following
year when the  new Constitution was finally ready: dominance over  the  conduct
of  monetary  policy  was  shifted from  the  National  Monetary Council to  the
Central  Bank  where  regional  and  local  concerns were  less  likely  to  exert  a
decisiv~e  influence.
Though  certainly  beneficial, the  two  changes  mentioned above  are  still
far  from  being  sufficient as  a  means of  guaranteeing an  effective conduct of
31monetary policy by  the  federal govemment. The new  system has  not  yet  ruled
out  another  important channel  for  intergovemmental interaction in  this  area.
This  can  be found in  the nature of  the  relations between the  Central Bank and
the  state  banking  institutions.  The  recurrent  bail-outs  of  troubled  state
banks  by  the  federal  monetary  authorities are  a  contributing factor  to  both
monetary  instability and  the  lack  of  transparency in  govemment finances.  In
1987, for  instance, nearly one  half  of  the  monetary base  was  constituted by
debt of the state banks with the Central Bank.
There  is  then  one  major  problem  concerning  monetary  policy
implementation under  the  current  system  of  intergovernmental relations  in
Brazil,  this  is  the  nature of  the  state  bank  crisis.
5.3  Policy Recommendations
In  view  of  the  above discussions, the  following policy  recommendations,
concerning  the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies, may be warranted.
5.3.1  Fiscal Policy
5.3.1.1  The Need to Accelerate  Operacao  Desmonte
The  decentralization of  fiscal resources imposed  by  the  new  Constitution
has  not  yet  beep'  accompanied by  the  corresponding shifting  of  expenditure
responsibilities to  lower  levels  of  govemment.  This  has  overburdened  the
federal  government with  obligations well  beyond its  current  means which  has,
as  a  consequence, substantially limited  its  flexibility over  the  spending  of
the  funds  that  remain  under  federal jurisdiction. That  puts  a  clear  check  on
the  stabilization function of  the  central  authority.  Since  it  can  barely  meet
its  current  expenditure responsibilities, how,  for  instance,  could  it  possibly
engage in  expansionary measures to  reverse signs of  macroeconomic distress? It
is  recommended, therefore, that  "Operacao Desmonte" should be  accelerated so
32that  the  federal  authorities  can  regain  some  control  over  key  policy
variables.  An  effective  shift  of  responsibilities  to  the  lower  levels  of
government  would  free  federAd finances  from  their  current  strain  so  that
macroeconomic stabilization could  regain  its  place  in  the  projects  of  fiscal
policy makers. 39
5.3.1.2  Discretionary  Transfers
Another  related  measure  that  deserves  immediate  attention  is  a
reassessment  of  the  current  system  of  non-Constitutional transfers.  The
adve,rse implications of  the  so-called  negotiated transfers  for  efficiez 1cy  and
equity considerations have been pointed out  elsewhere and  will  not  be  detailed
here. 40 The  standard objection to  these  transfers is  that  the  ad  hoc  nature of
their  allocation  process  puts  too  much  discretion  in  the  hands  of  federal
authorities  opening  opportunities  for  political  and  populist  motives  to
supplant economic ones. 41 From a macroeconomic  perspective,  however, it must be
understood  that  it  is  still  important  for  the  federal  government  to  retain
some  discretionary  power  over  the  allocation  of  its  transfers.  This
discretionary power,  however,  instead  of  being  a  device  to  buy  political
support  from  governors and  mayors,  should be  used  to  achieve  the  goal  of
macroeconomic stabilization.  It  is  recommended that  the  funds  that  would
The  frustrated  attempt  to  transfer  public  spending  responsibilities  in
social programns  was discussed in page 5.
40
See  Shah  (1990)  and  Afonso  (1989).  These  authors  have  suggested  the
replacement  of  this  type  of  trmnsfers  by  one  that  takes  into  account  objective
clear-cut  criteria  with  well  defined  ula.  In  addition,  Shah  has  suggested
the  end  of  direct  fedeml  transfers  to  municipaties;  state  govenmments  would
bc  in  a  beter  position  to  play  this  role  with  their  respective
municipalities.  These  suggestions,  as  will  be  shown,  ate  consistent  with  the
present analysis.
41
In  fact,  the  intensification  of  'Operacao  Desmonte"  advocated  above  would
certainly  be  a  factor  contributing  to  putting  aI  end  in  these  Idnds  of
transfers.
33otherwise  go  to  the  financing  of  negotiated transfers,  and  also  those  no
longer going to  finance functions abandoned through Operacio Desmonte, should
help  constitute  a  strategic  reserve  to  which  the  federal  government  should
resort for the implementation  of macroeconomic  management --in  periods of  poor
economic performance, specific purpose grants could be  used  to  stimulate state
and  local  expenditures  in  areas  with  the  largest  multiplier  impact  on
aggregate  demand. 42
5.3.1.3  A More Reliable Federal Tax Base
As  earlier  noted,  one  of  the  problems  that  the  new  Brazilian  fiscal
federalism  has  posed  to  the  issue  of  macroeconomic management  is  the
relatively  limited  participation  that  the  federal  government  has  on  tax
assignment and  revenue  collections. With  limited revenues, it  is  unlikely  that
the  conditions  for  fiscally  based  stabilization  policies  can  significantly
improve. Under  the  current  system, the  center  derives  most  of  its  revenues
from  personal and  corporate  income taxes  --that  is  in  spite  of  the  fact  that
it  transfers 47%  of  the  proceeds of  these  taxes  to  states  and  municipalities.
It  has  been  pointed  out  elsewhere, however,  that  the  most  reliable  revenue
source  in  developing  countries  is  actually  the  value-added  tax.  4  This  is
because tax  evasion is  less pervasive with  a  VAT. As  discussed, however, the
Brazilian  VAT  (ICMS)  is  entirelv  under  state  jurisdiction  and  the  federal
government has  no  participation what so  ever  in  its  proceeds. The  suggestions
42  In  any  case,  even  if  such  fund  is  not  formally  instituted,  the  end  of
negotiated  transfers  by  itself  would  be  sufficient  to  help  enhance  federal
govemment's  flexibility  over  the  use  of  its  fiscal  policy  instruments.  As
with.  "Operacao  Desmonte",  the  funds  saved  through  this  measure  could  be  used
to  reduce  the  federal  deficit  so  as  to  pu;  the  central  government  in  better
conditions to  engage in  stabilization  policies whenever necessary.
See  Khalilzadeh-Shirani  and Shah (forthcoming).
34here  are  that  this  tax  should  be  shifted  to  federal  jurisdiction  and  that
participation  in  its  proceeds  should  be  extended  to  all  three  levels  of
government.4 States might be  less reluctant to  accept such measure if  the  new
federal VAT  were to  be  implemented as  a  merger of  taxes  from all  levels of
governmcnt: the  state  ICMS,  the  federal  IPI,  and  the  municipal  ISS.  This
measure will also reduce administration  and compliance  cost of a VAT. 45
It  is  therefore argued that  the  transfer of  VAT  taxing power from  state
to  federal  jurisdiction  would  not  only  provide  the  latter  with  a  valuable
source  of  revenues  that  could  enhance  flexibility in  the  implementation of
macroeconomic management via  fiscal policy,  but  also  make  the  national  tax
system more efficient. With  a  more dependable revenue source the  perspectives
for fiscally based stabilization  policies would certainly be brighter.
5.3.1.4  Strategic Interactions  among Governments
Given  the  new  division of  powers in  fiscal  matters in  Brazil,  there  are
two  additional considerations that  must  be  taken into  account for  a  complete
appreciation of  the  effectiveness of  fiscal  policy.  These  are  the  two  related
problems  that  will  be  called  "adverse  incentives"  and  "strategic  behavior".
Accordingly,  the following recommendations  are made:
The  first  policy  suggestion concerns the  adverse incentives that  the  new
revenue  sharing and  transfer mechanisms have provided to  the  lower  levels of
government. Given  the  generosity of  these  mechanisms towards  states  and
municipalities,  especially  the  latter,  there  is  a  growing  concern  that
municipalities might  be  "free  riding"  on  federal  and  state  transfers  instead
44
These  suggestions  should  become  less  impofnant  the  larger  the  extent  of  the
actual shifts of  expenditures to  lower levels of  governmentL
45
4  Tax  bases  for  IPI,  ICMS,  and  ISS  somewhat  overlap  but  are  administered
separately  by  three  levels  of  government...  (They)  should  be  combined  into  one
tax  to  be  administered  by  the  federal  goverment  on  behalf  of  state  and  local
govemments.  Thus  the  proceeds  from  the  tax  be  shared  by  the  three  levels  in
proportion to  their current intake from this source." (Shah, 1990, pp. 34-35)
35of  undertaking unpopular measures concerning the  collection and  institution of
local taxes and  fees  to  finance their  own expenditures. 46 This  implies that  the
federal  government  is  overburdened with  responsibilities that  could  suitably
be  financed  through  local  charges.  Such  a  situation  presumably adds  to  the
degree  of  inflexibility  in  the  allocation  of  federal  fiscal  policy  variables.
A  measure that  would help  correct both  the  federal  budget problem  and  the
"disincentives for  municipalities to  exploit  own  revenue  sources" would  be  a
disbandment of  federal  transfers  to  municipalities and  their  substitution  by
state  transfers. 47 "States  transfers  to  municipal  levels  could  be  based  on  a
formula...  which  incorporates  per  capita  municipal  fiscal  capacity  as  an
important  factor..."  (Shah,  1990,  p.92)  Thus  the  same  level  of  federal,
state,  and  local  services could  be  provided with  much  less  pressure on  the
federal  budget  who  would  then  be  able  to  devote  more  resources  to
macroeconomic  management  whenever needed.
The  second  recommendation  relates  to  the  possibilities  for  policy
coordination and  cooperation among different levels  of  government concerning
the  conduct  of  fiscal  policy.  Given  the  current  division  of  powers,  all
parties,  especially  the  federal  and  the  state  governments, must  take  into
account  the  possible  reactions  of  their  counterparts  at  other  layers  of
government when  making  their  fiscal  policy  decisions.48 Fiscal  considerations
at  one  level  of  government will  very  likely  have  non-negligible repercussions
at  the  other  levels. The  relevant question  here  would  be  in  which  direction
46  Tbis  could  be  especally  true  for  the  case  of  negotiated  transfers.  Often
they  ame  used  to  finance  functions  under  local  responsibility.  (See  Shah
(1990).  Andrade  (1989).  and  Afonso  (1988)  for  a  discussion).
47
Acoidingly,  federal  trnsfen  to  states  would  be  increased.  That  would  not
put  the  federal  govemment  under  any  additional  pressure  given  that  this  is
just  a  counterpat  to  the  disbandment  of  direct  transfers  to  municipalities.
As  mentioned  before,  a  federal  tax  cut  might  be  at  least  partially  offset  by
states  anempt  to  increase  own  tax  effort  or  rates  to  counterbalance  the  loss
in  shaed  revenues  from  the  federal  govermen.L
36states  would  behave  when  facing  discretionary  changes  in  federal  fiscal
policy.  Would  they  be  willing  to  go  along  with  the  federal  initiative and
promote  tax  cuts  in  times  of  recession and  cut  expenditures in  times  of
inflation?  Or  would  their  individual  interests  dictate  measures  in  the
opposite  direction  of  the  federal  authorities?  In  any  likelihood,  the
recommendation is  simply a  warning that  the  new  system  will require a  great
deal  of  cooperation, and  therefore  compromises, between  federal  and  state
authorities.  Under  the  new  system  of  intergovernmental relations  in  Brazil,
even  though  the  ultimate  burden  of  macroeconomic stabilization still  lies  in
the  hands  of  the  federal  government, the  success  of  fiscal  policy  depends
largely  on  some  cooperation and  negotiation with  at  least  the  richest  states
of the federation.  4
5.3.1.5  Summary of Recommendations  for Fiscal Policy
(i)  The  federal  government  should  no  longer  be  involved  in  direct
transfers  to  local  governments. Instead  it  should  increase  its  transfers  to
states  and  let  states  replace it  as  a  grantor of  fiscal  transfers to  their  own
municipalities. States  would  be  in  a  better  position  to  monitor  the  fiscal
behavior of their municipalities,  especially their fiscal effort.
(ii)  In  areas  of  common responsibility of  federal and  state  governments,
the  former  should  limit  itself  to  setting  standards  for  public  services
provision  while  leaving  the  financing  and  administrative responsibilities  to
the  lower  levels of  government. Even  though this  might imply  weaker federal
control  over  public  spending, this  helps  achieve  the  much  needed  balance
49
It  should  come  then  as  no  surprise  that  when  the  Color  Plan  was  being
implemented,  the  Govemor  to  Sao  Paulo,  by  far  the  nchest  and  most
industialized  state  of  the  federation,  was  one  of  the  frut  to  step  down  and
assure  the  federal  govemment  that  it  would  go  along  with  it  in  the  menaues
to  avoid  massive  unemployment  while  the  recessive  effects  of  the
anti-inflation  plan were having their impact on the economy.
37between  federal  revenues  and  expenditure  responsibilities  that  would  enhance
flexibility  for the conduct of  macroeconomic management.
(iii)  The  IPI,  ICMS,  and  ISS  should  all  be  merged  into  one  single  VAT  to
be  under  federal  jurisdiction.  Participation  in  this  new  tax  should  be
extended  to  all levels of  government.
(iv)  Policy  coordination  should  gain  a  new  meaning  under  the  new  system
of  intergovernmental fiscal relations.
5.3.2  Monetary Policy
5.3.2.1  State Bank Reform
Given  that  the  financial  problems  of  state  banks  are  largely  attributed
to  their  role  as  quasi-fiscal  agents  of  their  governments,  it  is  recommended
that  clear  guidelines  by  the  Central  Bank  on  loans  by  state  banks  to  their
treasuries  be  instituted.  Stricter  preventive  regulation  and  monitoring  over
the  portfolio  allocations  of  state  commercial  banks  would  certainly  be
desirable.
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